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ANTITRUST AND NONPROFIT HOSPITAL MERGERS:
A RETURN TO BASICS
BARAK D. RICHMAN

†

Courts reviewing proposed mergers of nonprofit hospitals have too often
abandoned the bedrock principles of antitrust law, failing to pay heed to the
most elemental hallmarks of socially beneficial competition. This Article suggests that courts’ misapplication of antitrust law in these cases reflects a failure
to understand the structural details of the American health care market. After
reviewing recent cases in which courts have rejected challenges to proposed mergers between nonprofit hospitals, it documents how courts have engaged in a
faulty analysis that ultimately protects nonprofit hospitals from the rigors of
standard antitrust scrutiny. It then identifies the core principles of antitrust
law—preventing supracompetitive prices, optimizing output, and maximizing
allocative efficiency—that have been absent from, if not violated by, the rulings
in these merger cases.
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In recent years, courts reviewing proposed mergers of nonprofit
hospitals have abandoned the bedrock principles of antitrust law. The
hallmarks of socially beneficial competition—maximizing allocative
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efficiency and total surplus—are absent from their analysis. Not surprisingly, this trend has yielded a string of cases in which antitrust enforcers have lost challenges to proposed mergers that courts likely
1
would have prohibited had they occurred in other industries. This
2
string of losses has troubled many antitrust policymakers, causing
some to wonder whether the core principles of competition law are
being forsaken in favor of political expedience and favorable predis3
positions toward the health care sector. One knowledgeable commentator has suggested that “the role of antitrust law in monitoring
the health care industry faces an increasingly uncertain, and perhaps
4
diminishing, future.”
The futility of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department
of Justice (DOJ) challenges in federal courts has caught the attention

1

See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v.
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2000), amended by 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137 (N.D.
Cal. 2001); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302-03 (W.D.
Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997); United
States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot,
107 F.3d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 1997); Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 285
(1994).
2
See, e.g., William M. Sage, Protecting Competition and Consumers: A Conversation with
Timothy J. Muris, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 101, 103 (quoting the former
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission as saying, “In hospital merger cases, the
government is zero for the last seven. I don’t know the specifics of every case, but
what’s striking is the zero. I can certainly accept the idea that the government should
not have won them all. But it seems very unlikely the government should have lost
them all.”).
3
See James F. Blumstein, The Application of Antitrust Doctrine to the Healthcare Industry: The Interweaving of Empirical and Normative Issues, 31 IND. L. REV. 91, 111, 112
(1998) (arguing that some approaches to mergers of nonprofit hospitals “abandon[]
reliance on the structural guarantees of a competitive marketplace in favor of reliance
on alternative mechanisms” and that such an “analysis is really driven by normative
rather than empirical concerns”); see also Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The
Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 185,
187, 188 (discussing the apparent “judicial disdain” for applying traditional antitrust
principles to health care providers, as well as the outright “rejection of conventional
norms that guide competition law” in decisions reviewing hospital mergers).
4
Greaney, supra note 3, at 185; see also id. at 193 (“Case law has constrained enforcers’ ability to control concentration and has given overly permissive signals to providers who are contemplating further consolidation.”). Additional erosion of antitrust
scrutiny is attributable to state legislatures. In the early 1990s, eighteen states enacted
programs to “provide an exemption from state antitrust laws and also provide immunity from federal antitrust enforcement under the state action immunity doctrine.”
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE: FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS CONCERNING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 11 (1994).
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of many scholars and has prompted a search for explanations. Some
scholars have concluded that, as a general matter, courts do not want
competition in the health care sector and prefer instead to entrust
benevolent monopolists to act in the community’s best interests. They
thus delegate health care allocations to paternalistic hospitals rather
5
than empower consumers to motivate the competitive process.
Alarmed by judicial declarations such as “[i]n the real world, hospitals
are in the business of saving lives, and managed care organizations are
6
in the business of saving dollars,” commentators in this camp conclude that the hospital merger cases amount to a carve-out of antitrust
enforcement and “present some of the most serious and successful
challenges to traditional economic presumptions that can be found
7
anywhere in contemporary antitrust law.”
Other scholars attribute the losing streak to the complexity of
hospital merger cases and the subsequent likelihood that judges will
8
make mistakes in various steps of the legal analysis. Determining the
relevant geographic and product markets, for example, requires significant technical sophistication and commonly leads to judicial er9
ror. Courts have also tended to underestimate a merged facility’s
5

See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the
Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 614-15 (2002) (“In [hospital merger] cases, antitrust
courts occasionally veer towards heresy, explicitly questioning the desirability of competition . . . .”). For this reason, Martin Gaynor has urged antitrust enforcers who litigate such cases to advance rudimentary objectives to the judge and jury by articulating
“convincing arguments about . . . the desirability of competition in health care markets” and that “monopoly harms health care consumers just like it harms the consumers of conventional products.” Martin Gaynor, Why Don’t Courts Treat Hospitals Like
Tanks for Liquefied Gasses? Some Reflections on Health Care Antitrust Enforcement, 31 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 497, 502 (2006).
6
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302.
7
Hammer & Sage, supra note 5, at 616. Hammer and Sage go on to suggest that
courts’ aversion to applying antitrust principles to nonprofit hospitals might be attributable to natural sympathies that federal judges have for those who run health care
organizations. See id. at 617 (“The small, elite club of individuals from which hospitals
draw their boards of trustees shares much with the privileged pool from which most
federal district court judges emerge.”).
8
See Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and
Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 192 (1997) (“[C]ourts deciding hospital merger
cases are asked to make exceedingly fine-tuned appraisals of complex economic relationships. . . . Like pilots landing at night aboard an aircraft carrier, courts are aiming
for a target that is small, shifting and poorly illuminated.”); Jennifer R. Conners,
Comment, A Critical Misdiagnosis: How Courts Underestimate the Anticompetitive Implications of Hospital Mergers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 543, 562 (2003) (arguing that courts have erred
in, inter alia, defining product and geographic markets and estimating market power).
9
See, e.g., Cory S. Capps et al., Antitrust Policy and Hospital Mergers: Recommendations
for a New Approach, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 677, 679-80 (2002) (criticizing a method
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10

market power.
In addition, recent decisions suggest that many
courts fail to understand the nature of nonprice competition, such
that a concern about escalating health care costs leads to an interpretation of duplicative investments in technologies as socially wasteful,
11
rather than as a reflection of robust competition on quality.
However, although some judges may be hostile toward competition in the health care industry, and even if the requisite antitrust
analysis in these cases is difficult, the inability of courts to properly
apply antitrust law in these cases reflects a more fundamental, and arguably more troubling, problem: a failure to understand how the
structure of the American health care sector shapes market competition.
The most important features of the U.S. health care system include the financing of care through insurance, a tax system that subsidizes health insurance, a legal and regulatory system that tends to
require all “medically necessary” care, and a reliance on private nonprofit institutions to provide care to the indigent, technological innovation, and other public goods. These features are critical in understanding the market for health care, and they accordingly shape a
proper antitrust analysis. However, because courts have not adequately recognized the economic significance of these structural features, they have misunderstood the dangers of market power in the
health care sector and have thus inappropriately relaxed the standards
of antitrust law.
This Article attempts to refocus hospital merger review on the
foundations of antitrust law. It begins with a review of recent cases in
which the FTC and DOJ unsuccessfully challenged proposed mergers
between nonprofit hospitals, documenting how courts have engaged
in a faulty analysis that ultimately protects nonprofit hospitals from
the rigors of standard antitrust scrutiny. The Article then identifies
bedrock principles of antitrust law—preventing supracompetitive
prices, optimizing output, and maximizing allocative efficiency—that
commonly used by courts to assess market power); Gregory J. Werden, The Limited Relevance of Patient Migration Data in Market Delineation for Hospital Merger Cases, 8 J. HEALTH
ECON. 363, 363, 376 (1989) (attributing discrepancies in court decisions to difficulties
“delineating the geographic scope of markets”); Matthew Reiffer, Note, Antitrust Implications in Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, 27 J. LEGIS. 187, 192 (2001) (lamenting that judicial
analyses of market definition are often “derived primarily from ‘guesswork’”).
10
James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, 46
ANTITRUST BULL. 299, 323-24 (2001).
11
Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and NonPrice Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 755 (1999).
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have been absent from, if not violated by, the rulings in these merger
cases.
I. THE SETTING: COURTS’ PROTECTION OF NONPROFITS
There is little dispute that when courts are asked to evaluate the
potential benefits and harms of nonprofit market power, they are addressing issues of substantial policy importance. Rising health care
costs are a matter of national alarm, and increasing attention has been
paid to the growing market power accumulated by health care providers. Recent studies suggest that market power pervades the health
care sector and is responsible for a torrent of supracompetitive—and
12
even supramonopoly—prices. Moreover, much of the recent rise in
health care costs is directly attributable to increases in supply-side
market power that are products of hospital consolidations and the
13
growth of provider collaborations.
Antitrust agencies, which are

12

See Cory Capps & David Dranove, Hospital Consolidation and Negotiated PPO Prices,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 175, 179 (finding that “most consolidating hospitals
raise prices by more than the median price increase in their markets”); Katharine Levit
et al., Health Spending Rebound Continues in 2002, HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 147,
155 (ascribing rising costs, in part, to hospitals’ growing market power). For a detailed
study of growing market concentration in the health insurance sector, see AM. MED.
ASS’N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF U.S. MARKETS: 2007 UPDATE (2007), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/
mm/368/compstudy_52006.pdf, and for a discussion of the related increase in prices,
see James C. Robinson, Consolidation and the Transformation of Competition in Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 11, 17, 19 (empirically showing the “consolidation of the [health insurance] industry at the hands of the largest health plans,” as
well as the fact that from 2000 through 2003, “health plans . . . were able to raise prices
consistently above the rate of growth in costs”). This evidence has been sufficient to
convince the FTC that “increased hospital concentration is associated with increased
prices.” See FTC & DOJ, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION, ch. 3, at
10-16 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/204694.pdf
[hereinafter A DOSE OF COMPETITION].
For a brief overview of commonly identified sources of rising health care expenditures, see HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION 39 (1991) (attributing
rising expenditures to the stimulation of demand through third-party payment, rising
provider compensation, the aging of the American population, malpractice litigation,
and especially the growth of expensive new technologies).
13
See Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, Competition Among Hospitals, 34 RAND J.
ECON. 764, 764 (2003) (“During the second half of the 1990s, a dramatic wave of hospital consolidation occurred in the United States. . . . [M]any local markets, including
quite a few large cities such as Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, have come to
be dominated by two or three large hospital systems. Not surprisingly, many health
plans have complained about rising prices as a result of this consolidation.”); Gaynor,
supra note 5, at 498-99 (documenting that the median and mean Herfindahl-
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empowered by the Clayton Act to investigate and challenge in federal
14
court mergers that would lead to anticompetitive consequences, appropriately identified growing hospital market power as an enforcement priority. As the merger wave of the 1990s spread to hospitals,
federal and state antitrust policymakers mustered a number of ambi15
tious challenges to proposed mergers of nonprofit hospitals.
However laudable these enforcement efforts were, antitrust enforcement agencies have found little success, losing each of the seven
16
suits initiated since 1994 to challenge proposed hospital mergers.
Antitrust scholars have already spilled significant ink criticizing the
17
judicial reasoning and outcomes in those cases. However, retracing
the development of these cases illustrates not only how the courts
erred, but also how they became mistakenly preoccupied with a narrow legal question, how that preoccupation developed into a wholesale exemption, and how antitrust enforcers inadvertently fueled the
mistaken emphasis. The narrow question that preoccupied the courts
in each of these cases was whether nonprofits, especially when enjoying market power, exhibited pricing behavior that was statistically different from that of for-profit hospitals. While the question is potentially of great importance, since a nonprofit’s failure to capitalize on
market power (as for-profits are presumed to do) might militate
against rigorous antitrust enforcement, its answer does not reveal
whether nonprofits decline to exercise market power, which is the

Hirschmann Index (HHI) for U.S. hospital markets rose steadily from 1985 to 2000,
with a “very concentrated” mean HHI of 3995 in 2000).
It is a matter of additional concern that substantial evidence suggests that these
mergers produced price increases that far outweighed their alleged efficiencies. On
the price-increasing effects of mergers and consolidations, see DAVID DRANOVE, THE
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 122 (2000) (“I have asked many
providers why they wanted to merge. Although publicly they all invoked the synergies
mantra, virtually everyone stated privately that the main reason for merging was to
avoid competition and/or obtain market power.”); Jack Zwanziger & Cathleen
Mooney, Has Price Competition Changed Hospital Revenues and Expenses in New York?, 42
INQUIRY 183, 190 (2005) (finding that mergers undermined price- and cost-reducing
effects of hospital competition following deregulation). Hospital mergers have also
limited the ability of insurers to reduce prices. See MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 57 (2005) (noting that insurers’ use of selective
contracting “has been limited by both hospital consolidation and consumers’ reluctance to accept limitations on their choice of providers”).
14
See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
15
See supra note 1.
16
See supra note 1; see also A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 1.
17
See, e.g., Capps & Dranove, supra note 12, at 180; Greaney, supra note 8, at 220;
Greaney, supra note 3, at 193; Hammer & Sage, supra note 5, at 617.
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central concern in merger cases. Nonetheless, by myopically focusing
on whether corporate form has any statistical significance at all, courts
absolved nonprofits from appropriate scrutiny.
Antitrust agencies had little reason to believe that courts in the
1990s would be so unreceptive to their merger challenges, since earlier courts were skeptical of carving out an antitrust exemption for
nonprofit hospitals. In an important 1986 decision, Judge Richard
Posner remarked, “The adoption of the nonprofit form does not
change human nature, as the courts have recognized in rejecting an
18
implicit antitrust exemption for nonprofit enterprises.” Judge Posner then went further, suggesting that nonprofits might even be more
likely than for-profits to charge supracompetitive prices and engage in
anticompetitive conduct: “[C]ompelled as they are to treat charity
cases while minimizing the cost to the taxpayers of supporting the
hospital, public hospitals are under added pressure to charge high
prices to their paying (or insured) patients, which may make collusion
19
particularly attractive to these hospitals.”
A subsequent ruling from Judge Posner, in another FTCchallenged merger four years later, reiterated the same skepticism toward treating nonprofits differently from other hospitals: “We are
aware of no evidence—and the defendants present none, only argument—that nonprofit suppliers of goods or services are more likely to
compete vigorously than profit-making suppliers. Most people do not
like to compete, and will seek ways of avoiding competition by agree20
ment tacit or explicit . . . .” One year later, Judge Gerald Tjoflat expressed the same inclination to impose the antitrust laws with equal
18

Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984); Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit
Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1447, 1465 (1980)).
19
Id. at 1391.
20
United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).
Judge Posner also reiterated that nonprofits are likely to pose greater danger to competition than for-profits, adding,
The ideology of nonprofit enterprise is cooperative rather than competitive.
If the managers of nonprofit enterprises are less likely to strain after that last
penny of profit, they may be less prone to engage in profit-maximizing collusion but by the same token less prone to engage in profit-maximizing competition.
Id. Judge Frank Easterbrook similarly presumed that nonprofits would exploit market
power if presented with the opportunity. See Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins.,
Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340-41 (7th Cir. 1986) (remanding a Sherman Act section 2 claim
to determine whether nonprofit defendants had sufficient market power to shift costs
to rivals).
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rigor on both nonprofits and for-profits. Citing both of Judge Posner’s opinions, Judge Tjoflat concluded that “the nonprofit status of
the acquiring firm will not, by itself, help a defendant overcome the
21
presumption of illegality.”
These remarks, intended merely to subject nonprofits to the demands of antitrust law, may have inadvertently introduced the question of whether nonprofit hospitals’ competitive strategies differed
from those of for-profits. That question was seized upon in more recent antitrust court rulings, in which courts have expressed a far more
22
generous attitude toward nonprofit hospitals.
The first antitrust
opinion to take this position in recent decades was the 1989 ruling in
23
United States v. Carilion Health System.
In rejecting the FTC’s challenge to the proposed merger between nonprofit hospitals, the court
ruled that the merger would improve the efficiency of both hospitals
24
and thus would “strengthen, rather than reduce, competition.” The
court then continued,
Defendants’ nonprofit status also militates in favor of finding their combination reasonable. Defendants’ boards of directors both include business leaders who can be expected to demand that the institutions use the
savings achieved through the merger to reduce hospital charges . . . .
[T]he court concludes that [defendants’] nonprofit status weighs in fa25
vor of their merger’s being reasonable.

21

FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991). Judge Tjoflat
also invoked NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984), in concluding that
“the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that nonprofit corporations act under
such a different set of incentives than for-profit corporations that they are entitled to
an implicit exemption from the antitrust laws.” Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1224.
22
Richard Schmalbeck observes that nonprofit hospitals enjoy a similar generosity
from tax courts and IRS rulings. Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impact of Tax-Exempt
Status: The Supply-Side Subsidies, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 121, 126.
23
707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff’d, No. 89-2625, 1989 WL 157282, at *4
(4th Cir. Nov. 29, 1989).
24
Id. at 849.
25
Id. To reach this conclusion, the court relied on expert testimony to arrive at
two key factual findings that favored the defendants. First, the court concluded that
“as a general rule hospital rates are lower, the fewer the number of hospitals in an
area”—in other words, nonprofit market concentration is correlated with lower prices.
Id. at 846. And second, “charitable, nonprofit hospitals tend to charge lower rates than
for-profit hospitals,” suggesting that nonprofits do not utilize market power like forprofits. Id. The court offered little analysis explaining how it arrived at these conclusions but mentioned in a footnote that the FTC’s expert witness, who predicted that
the merger would increase prices, “did not explain the basis of his findings to the
court’s satisfaction,” and that the defendants’ witness “raised serious questions about
[the FTC’s] method of analysis.” Id. at 846 n.6.
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The neutral observer might consider this statement largely innocuous—particularly since the court provided many bases for its decision that did not rely on the merging entities’ tax status and since
the court based its analysis predominantly on the definition of the
26
hospitals’ geographic market.
Moreover, when the Fourth Circuit
upheld the lower court’s ruling, it did so in an unpublished opinion
that did not mention the district judge’s assertion that boards will re27
strain a nonprofit’s managers from capitalizing on market power.
28
But the issue emerged again in 1995, in FTC v. Freeman Hospital.
This case, like Carilion, involved a proposed merger of two nonprofit
hospitals in which the parties disputed (among other issues) the geo29
graphic and product markets.
Without citing Carilion, the court
reached an almost identical, though more sweeping, conclusion regarding the significance of the hospitals’ corporate form:
Arguably, a private nonprofit hospital that is sponsored and directed by
the local community is similar to a consumer cooperative. It is highly
unlikely that a cooperative will arbitrarily raise prices merely to earn
higher profits because the owners of such an organization are also its
consumers. Similarly, if a nonprofit organization is controlled by the
very people who depend on it for service, there is no rational economic
incentive for such an organization to raise its prices to the monopoly
30
level even if it has the power to do so.

In applying this principle to the merging entities and approving the
merger, the court concluded that “it would not be in [the defendants’] best economic interest to permit prices to rise beyond a nor31
mal competitive level.”
26

See id. at 847-48.
See United States v. Carilion Health Sys., No. 89-2625, 1989 WL 157282 (4th Cir.
Nov. 29, 1989).
28
911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995).
29
Under the FTC’s alternative market definitions, the proposed merger would
create a market with an HHI between 2288 and 4356. Id. at 1222. The hospitals argued that the merger would result in an HHI between 1322 and 1624. Id. Under the
Department of Justice’s merger guidelines, a market is not “highly concentrated” until
the HHI reaches 1800. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552,
41,558 (Sept. 10, 1992).
30
Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1222 (citations omitted).
31
Id. at 1227. In asking “who controls the hospitals,” the court revealed that
twelve of the board’s eighteen members were owners, employees, or retirees of local
businesses and concluded that “the vast majority of the combined Board of Trustees is
comprised of persons who indirectly represent the interests of hospital consumers.” Id.
at 1222-23. It is questionable, of course, whether employers adequately represent the
interests of their employees as health care consumers since employees ultimately pay
for the cost of health insurance. See infra note 43.
27
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Even though Freeman issued a sweeping generalization about the
nature of nonprofit-hospital pricing policies, its conclusion, like Carilion’s, did not rest exclusively on the nonprofit status of the merged
entity, and instead primarily relied on the defendants’ market definitions. Moreover, also like Carilion, the Freeman ruling was upheld in a
brief circuit opinion that did not discuss the relevance of nonprofit
32
status to competitive behavior. The Freeman opinion was, however,
distinct from Carilion in that it introduced some scholarship to sup33
port its characterization of nonprofits. The court cited William
Lynk’s Property Rights and the Presumptions of Merger Analysis, which concluded that “nonprofit hospitals behave differently than for-profit
hospitals. In particular, . . . nonprofit hospitals set lower prices than
34
otherwise comparable for-profit hospitals.”
Nonetheless, since the
nonprofit’s pricing behavior was not central to the court’s determination, the court’s musings into the nature of nonprofits appeared to be
little more than insignificant dicta. But the language in Freeman—like
35
the proverbial “loaded weapon” —became available to subsequent
courts reviewing mergers in which a nonprofit’s pricing behavior was a
36
critical issue.

32

See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995). The court briefly confirmed that the hospitals’ nonprofit status did not defeat the FTC’s jurisdiction in the
case. Id. at 266-67.
33
Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1222.
34
William J. Lynk, Property Rights and the Presumptions of Merger Analysis, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 363, 372 (1994). Lynk explains these findings through the lens of “property rights”: because the primary “property right” of for-profit firms—the investor’s
individual share—is not present in the nonprofit, the incentive to maximize the value
of that share is absent. Though the paper does not present any original empirical findings, and thus does not provide support for a particular theory of pricing behavior,
Lynk argues that the survey of prior research is sufficient to challenge those who believe that nonprofits maximize like other hospitals. Economists and antitrust policymakers, therefore, should at least hesitate before presuming that maximizing shareholder value—and the associated behaviors of seeking profit-maximizing prices—
drives nonprofit behavior. Id. at 366-70.
35
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”).
36
It appears that the Freeman opinion did not immediately capture widespread attention. In United States v. Mercy Health Services, another challenge to a proposed
merger of two nonprofit hospitals, the court wrote,
The hospitals have also asserted as a defense their non-profit status and procompetitive intent. The hospitals cite United States v. Carilion Health Sys. for
the proposition that the non-profit status of the hospitals can be considered in
determining whether the hospitals would act in an anticompetitive manner.
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37

Such a proposed merger arose in FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp.
Butterworth was also a challenge to a proposed merger between two
nonprofit hospitals, but unlike the rulings in Carilion and Freeman, the
Butterworth court accepted the FTC’s market definition and agreed
38
that the resulting hospital market would be highly concentrated.
Nonetheless, the court permitted the merger after concluding that
“nonprofit hospitals do not operate in the same manner as profit
39
maximizing businesses.” And in so deciding, the court cited the excerpt from Freeman, quoted above, that analogized a nonprofit hospi40
tal to a consumer cooperative.
In a lengthy opinion, the court supported its distinction between
for-profits and nonprofits on two separate but interrelated grounds.
First, relying on scholarship and expert testimony from William
41
Lynk, the court concluded that for nonprofit hospitals, “market conThe government points out, this is a questionable legal proposition. No other
courts have explicitly adopted this theory of defense.
902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citation omitted), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d
632, 637 (8th Cir. 1997).
37
946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1
(6th Cir. July 8, 1997).
38
See id. at 1294. For general acute inpatient care, the post-merger HHI would be
between 2767 and 4521, reflecting a gain of 1064 to 1889 points as a result of the
merger. For primary inpatient care, the post-merger HHI would range from 4506 to
5079, reflecting a gain of 1675 to 2001 points. The court concluded that “the proposed merger would result in a significant increase in the concentration of power in
two relevant markets, and produce an entity controlling an undue percentage share of
each of those markets.” Id. For concentration standards under the Department of Justice’s merger guidelines, see 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552,
41,558 (Sept. 10, 1992).
39
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296-97.
40
Id. at 1296 (citing FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (W.D. Mo.
1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995)).
41
The Butterworth court cited Lynk’s article, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L. & ECON. 437 (1995), which examines 1989 pricing data from
a cross-section of California hospitals to determine whether nonprofits price lower
than for-profits. 946 F. Supp. at 1296. The article finds that “nonprofit hospitals,
whether private or public, have statistically significantly lower list and net prices than
for-profit hospitals.” Lynk, supra, at 449-52. It also determines that nonprofit hospitals
exhibit a lower association between market share and price, and that for-profit hospitals (and government hospitals) tend to raise their prices following a merger while
nonprofit hospitals tend to slightly reduce theirs. Id. at 459. The article concludes
that “we should think twice before assessing both for-profit and nonprofit hospital
mergers with the same ex ante presumptions about their probable effects on price.”
Id. The Butterworth court also relied on Lynk’s expert testimony analyzing the Grand
Rapids hospital market that included the merging parties, in which Lynk “concluded
that in Michigan, too, higher hospital concentration is associated with lower nonprofit
hospital prices.” 946 F. Supp. at 1295.
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centration appears to be positively correlated not with higher prices,
42
but with lower prices.”
And second, it determined that “the involvement of prominent community and business leaders on the
boards of [both] hospitals can be expected to bring real accountability to price structuring,” especially since those leaders have “employees [who] depend on these facilities for services [and] have demonstrated their genuine commitment to serve the greater Grand Rapids
43
community.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision for the hospitals in a terse, unpublished per curiam ruling, concluding that “[t]he
record presented here does not leave us with a firm conviction that
44
the district court erred in its analysis of the facts.”
The Butterworth opinion was a sweeping victory for nonprofit hospitals because it carved out a different standard for nonprofits in the
application of antitrust laws. It also sparked some heated academic
commentary. One leading antitrust scholar called the ruling a “rejection of conventional norms that guide competition law” and a deci45
sion that “turned antitrust law on its head.” Another critic charged

42

946 F. Supp. at 1296. Lynk uses nearly identical language, concluding from his
study of California hospital markets that “on balance increased nonprofit market share
is associated with lower, not higher, prices.” Lynk, supra note 41, at 459.
43
946 F. Supp. at 1297, 1302. To reach this conclusion, the court gave significant
weight to a “Community Commitment” that the hospitals signed, which pledged to
freeze certain prices, limit profit margins, and maintain a commitment to serve the
medically needy. The pledge was designed “‘to assuage any purchaser concerns and to
reiterate [the hospitals’] strong conviction that the purpose and intent of the transaction is to reduce costs.’” Id. at 1298 (alteration in original). The FTC regarded the
document as “unenforceable, illusory or inadequate.” The court, however, found it to
be consistent with pledges from the hospitals’ chairmen (who “have community interests at heart”) that the merger was intended to lower health care costs, improve quality,
and enhance consumer welfare. See id. at 1297, 1302. These conclusions were also
consistent with observations the judge himself made during tours of the hospitals,
which convinced him that the hospitals were “well-maintained” and that the Board of
Directors would adhere to their “fiduciary responsibilities” to renovate and upgrade
their facilities. Id. at 1301.
There is an important but unappreciated irony in the judiciary’s confidence in
pledges by local business leaders to contain health care costs. Labor economists have
consistently found that even though employers purchase most health coverage for
their employees, the full costs are ultimately shouldered by employees, principally in
the form of reduced wages. See Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market
55 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6762, 1998) (reviewing the
empirical literature and concluding that “the results that attempt to control for worker
selection, firm selection, or (ideally) both, have produced a fairly uniform result: the
costs of health insurance are fully shifted to wages”).
44
FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *3 (6th Cir.
July 8, 1997).
45
Greaney, supra note 3, at 188.
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that Butterworth “push[ed] the envelope of antitrust enforcement with
an adherence to a paradigm of the health care industry that is, at
least, in tension with the pro-market mandate of antitrust law and, at
46
most, fundamentally inconsistent with the dictates of antitrust law.”
This critic warned further that the ruling “may undermine the ability
of the enforcement agencies to apply the procompetitive policies of
the antitrust law—for all their substantive and symbolic importance—
47
to an important component of the health care marketplace.” Several scholars also lamented the court’s reliance on Lynk’s scholarship,
48
which was heavily criticized in subsequent studies.

46

Blumstein, supra note 3, at 117. Though academic defenders of Butterworth were
fewer in number, some did weigh in, including one who praised the court for using
expert testimony and empirical evidence to “reconsider[] old presumptions in the
light of new evidence.” Michael S. Jacobs, Presumptions, Damn Presumptions and Economic Theory: The Role of Empirical Evidence in Hospital Merger Analysis, 31 IND. L. REV.
125, 142 (1998). For a more nuanced view that is sympathetic to the emerging trend
and supportive of a flexible application of antitrust laws to nonprofit hospitals, see
Thomas L. Greaney, Antitrust and Hospital Mergers: Does the Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive Substance?, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 511, 527 (2006) (“[C]ourts might be well
advised . . . [to] keep open the possibility of fashioning new presumptive rules tailored
to more complete economic accounts of nonprofit firm behavior.”).
47
Blumstein, supra note 3, at 117.
48
Questions over Lynk’s work, and the importance of the debate, prompted the
Journal of Health Economics to dedicate three of its January 1999 articles to investigating
the matter in greater detail—two by scholars who criticized Lynk’s findings and a third
in which Lynk and a coauthor could respond to Lynk’s critics. Most of the scholarly
attention was directed at Lynk’s examination of simulated hospital mergers using 1989
California pricing data. See supra note 41. One article was able to replicate Lynk’s
findings but arrived at opposite results after making small methodological changes; it
also discovered from data over several years that price increases from merging nonprofits grew larger over time. See Emmett B. Keeler et al., The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-Profit and For-Profit Hospital Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69, 83
(1999). The second article argued that two sources of bias led to Lynk’s results and,
after introducing adjustments, concluded that mergers of nonprofit hospitals are associated with, “[i]f anything,” higher prices than mergers of for-profits. David Dranove
& Richard Ludwick, Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A Reassessment of
Lynk’s Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87, 97 (1999). Lynk’s response attributed the conflicting findings to methodological differences, but he also emphasized that his 1995
paper was modest in its normative conclusions, noting that the “policy question that
[his earlier] work addresses is simply whether the distinction between for-profit and
nonprofit ownership matters, and therefore whether informed antitrust review of proposed hospital mergers should add that consideration to the checklist of other relevant
considerations.” William J. Lynk & Lynette R. Neumann, Price and Profit, 18 J. HEALTH
ECON. 99, 100-01 (1999). Echoing his 1995 call for a case-by-case analysis, Lynk urged
that determining nonprofit hospital pricing behavior remained an open empirical
question. Id. at 111.
The debate over whether nonprofit and for-profit hospitals price differently remains lively, though most studies dispute Lynk’s findings and do not support a case-by-
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In addition to carving out a generous antitrust exemption, Butterworth also lent support to those who argued that judges have a deepseated hostility to subjecting health care providers to competition.
The ruling concluded with some revealing language: “[m]anaged
care organizations’ interest in maintaining a competitive edge cannot
be allowed to trump either hospitals’ conscientious endeavors to continue to provide comprehensive, high quality health care in this rapidly evolving field, or the consuming public’s right to receive the
49
same.”
Thus, the court concluded simply that competition itself
does not serve the public interest. To the contrary, it entrusted market power to the directors of nonprofit hospitals and concluded that

case approach. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text; see also John Simpson,
FTC & Richard Shin, U.S. DOJ, Do Nonprofit Hospitals Exercise Market Power? 15-16 (FTC
Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 214, 1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
workpapers/wp214.pdf (concluding that nonprofit hospitals in concentrated markets
set prices that are statistically indistinguishable from those set by for-profits).
49
946 F. Supp. at 1302. The court then issued an even more sweeping indictment
of market forces, counterintuitively arguing that competition had impeded the realization of certain efficiencies:
Permitting defendant hospitals to achieve the efficiencies of scale that would
clearly result from the proposed merger would enable the board of directors
of the combined entity to continue the quest for establishment of world-class
health facilities in West Michigan, a course the Court finds clearly and unequivocally would ultimately be in the best interests of the consuming public
as a whole.
Id. The court’s hostile language could alternatively be interpreted to issue a narrower
indictment of the competitive pressures brought by managed care organizations
(MCOs). The court could have been responding to an argument advanced at trial:
that MCOs might negotiate lower prices for their own subscribers and thereby indirectly increase prices for all other consumers. Thus, rather than expressing hostility to
competition writ large, the court might have been suggesting that the competition introduced by MCOs is detrimental because it helps some but hurts others. And in remarking that “the interests of managed care organizations, as health care intermediaries, pale in comparison with those of the actual health care consuming public,” id., the
court perhaps was merely placing greater value on the welfare of certain consumers
and providers than on the benefits competition brought to MCOs.
Nonetheless, there is also reason to interpret the court’s language as a broad condemnation of competition in the health care sector: MCOs were the primary sources
of price competition; the court explicitly asserted that “even though competition may
be lessened, the interests of consumers are, under the unique circumstances of this
case, likely to be advanced rather than hurt,” id.; and the court’s reasoning relies,
above all, on the presumed altruism of nonprofit entities, their boards, and certain
pledges they made to expand output.

RICHMAN_FINAL.DOC

2007]

10/30/2007 10:10:22 PM

ANTITRUST AND NONPROFIT HOSPITAL MERGERS

135

the public benefits most when such hospitals grow and dominate a
50
market.
Wounded by its resounding defeat in Butterworth and its other
court losses, the FTC assembled a counterpunch in its 2004 report,
51
Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition. Gathering scholarly testimony on hospital pricing behavior, the report first shares William
Lynk’s testimony before the Commission, discussing his empirical
work and his repeated conclusion “that nonprofits that attain market
52
power behave differently from for-profits when it comes to pricing.”
The report then continues, “By contrast, several panelists maintained
that the best available empirical evidence indicated no significant differences between the pricing behavior of for-profit and nonprofit
53
hospitals.”
And, after listing the growing number of studies that
54
reach that conclusion, the report concludes,
Although institutional status has loomed large in debates and legal disputes, the best available evidence indicates that nonprofits exploit market power when given the opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the
profit/nonprofit status of the merging hospitals should not be considered a factor in predicting whether a hospital merger is likely to be anti55
competitive.

50

This same hostility was reflected in Freeman as well. In orally denying the FTC’s
motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proposed merger, the Freeman
court had even harsher words for FTC officials:
I don’t feel that the Federal Trade Commission has shown sufficient factual
basis that they are entitled to a TRO. . . . I don’t think you’ve got any business
being in here. I don’t see how the Federal Trade Commission can claim there
is lack of competition when there [are] four or five hospitals in the area, and
reducing it by one is not going to wipe out competition. . . . It looks to me like
Washington D.C. once again thinks they know better what’s going on in
southwest Missouri. I think they ought to stay in D.C.
FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1995) (alteration and omissions in
original) (quoting from the district court’s oral denial of the temporary restraining
order).
51
A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12.
52
Id. ch. 4, at 31.
53
Id.
54
Id. ch. 4, at 31-33 nn.166-79. The studies listed, in addition to those cited above,
include: Robert Connor et al., The Effects of Market Concentration and Horizontal Mergers
on Hospital Costs and Prices, 5 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 159 (1998); Elaine Silverman & Jonathan Skinner, Medicare Upcoding and Hospital Ownership, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 369
(2004); and Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers: A Case Study, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 63 (2001).
55
A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 33.
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The FTC’s assertive language is a transparent effort to bring an
56
end to the Carilion-Freeman-Butterworth legacy, even though it is unclear how far the trilogy advanced in carving out an established doctrine. While the cases cited and built upon each other, their lenient
antitrust approach has been neither recognized by a circuit court nor
57
acknowledged by Judge Posner in his recent academic writings. Unfortunately, the entire debate that worked its way through the litigation, the academy, and into the FTC report has focused on a question
that is secondary, and possibly irrelevant, to antitrust analysis. Even as
the courts regularly displayed wide-ranging antagonism to antitrust actions against nonprofit hospitals, their approvals of proposed mergers
rested, in part, on finding that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals exhibit different pricing behaviors. The FTC report, understandably
aiming to refute the conclusions and scholarship that motivated these
judicial opinions, focused on the same narrow question and thus inadvertently contributed to moving the debate toward a myopic and
unconstructive target. The debate has allowed antitrust analysis to
stray from what should be the focus.
Attention should instead focus on the consequences of nonprofit
market power and whether market power in the hands of nonprofit
hospitals is socially undesirable (regardless of whether it is more or
less desirable than market power in the hands of for-profits). Investigating this question could lead to a meaningful examination of how
market power combines with health insurance, affects output, and enables cross-subsidies. Refocusing the analysis in this direction is the
first step toward a return to antitrust principles.
II. A RETURN TO PRINCIPLES: UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE,
MORAL HAZARD, AND CROSS-SUBSIDIES
A confidence that nonprofit hospitals’ market concentration does
not lead to higher prices largely drives judicial sympathy for nonprofits in merger cases, and in turn a tolerance of nonprofits’ market
power. This view is not entirely unfounded, and the courts in Carilion,
56

At around the same time the FTC released its report, it launched a new attack in
this battle against nonprofit hospital mergers and initiated its complaint against Evanston Northwestern Healthcare. See infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
57
See, e.g., Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit
Sector 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12132, 2006)
(“[D]efendants will often argue that their [nonprofit] status entitles them either to an
outright exemption from antitrust scrutiny or to a different, more permissive standard
of liability. These arguments fail.”).
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Freeman, and Butterworth relied on expert testimony and some academic scholarship to reach their conclusions that nonprofits would
58
not impose monopoly prices. But this is altogether the wrong focus.
Instead, attention should concentrate on prices, output, and efficiency. Even as the structural complexity of the health care system is
unbundled, a return to antitrust’s central principles reveals a surprisingly straightforward analysis.
A. The Effects on Prices: Market Power Plus U.S.-Style Health Insurance
With courts focusing on potential differences between for-profit
and nonprofit hospitals, the antitrust debate has unfortunately revolved around, and has devolved into, the question of whether nonprofit hospitals set prices differently from for-profits. The primary
problem with this approach is that the baseline question is how a forprofit monopolist would price, when the concern should be whether
nonprofits exploit market power at all.
There is good reason to believe that market power yields especially pernicious consequences in the U.S. health care market, regardless of whether the owner of such market power is for-profit or nonprofit. Understanding the exploitation of market power in this
industry requires appreciating the critical role of health insurance in
determining market prices.
U.S.-style health insurance offers health care services to insureds
for a copayment that is far below the actual price charged for the desired care. It has long been understood that insurance of this sort
creates a moral hazard, which induces those with insurance to con59
sume more than they otherwise would if they faced market prices.
But insurance also means that providers face consumers who are significantly less price conscious, and thus present a steeper and less elas60
tic demand curve. In a competitive market for health care services,
the pervasiveness of insurance would likely have little effect on the
prices ultimately charged by providers, since competing providers
61
would drive the price charged down toward the marginal cost. In a

58
59
60

See supra notes 25, 34, 41, and accompanying text.
See, e.g., CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 116 (3d ed. 2003).
Id. at 117 (noting that insurance “makes the demand curve less elastic in gen-

eral”).
61

However, it is possible that, if the marginal cost curve of a particular service is
upward sloping, insurance could increase the equilibrium market price by stimulating
demand.
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concentrated market, however, providers facing a steep demand curve
will set prices where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, which
would be at prices that are even higher than monopoly prices would
be in the absence of insurance. Many assume that consumers’ lack of
price sensitivity is overcome by their heavy reliance on private insurers
acting as informed, aggressive purchasing agents that can negotiate
62
providers’ prices downward to competitive levels. But even if health
insurers can leverage their scale economies and industry expertise to
stimulate competition and negotiate attractive prices with some providers, they are toothless against a true monopolist. Effective bargaining against a monopolist provider would require insurers to threaten
not to cover a service that, by definition, has no adequate substitute,
and any such refusal would come into tension with the pervasive legal
63
requirement to cover all “medically necessary” care. Even if insurers
overcome regulatory and legal hurdles, those who refuse to cover any
such service subject themselves to likely lawsuits, angry protests, and
the scorn of judges who accuse them of saving dollars rather than
64
human life.

62

See Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining Ventures: An Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989, 997 (2004).
63
See Mark V. Pauly, Competition and New Technology, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1523, 1528-29
(2005) (arguing that technology costs are uncontrolled, in part, because insurers do
not enjoy the contractual freedom to exclude coverage for expensive care); Clark C.
Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
2002, at 55, 73 (lamenting that managed care organizations do not enjoy the legal ability to limit coverage to care that meets appropriate cost-benefit benchmarks). On the
pervasiveness of the “medically necessary” standard, and its effect on limiting the ability to constrain health care costs, see Timothy P. Blanchard, “Medical Necessity” Determinations—A Continuing Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599, 623-24 (2004);
Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1525, 1549-51 (1996); and William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE
L.J. 597, 605-09 (2003).
64
Recall the Butterworth court’s admonition to the FTC that “[i]n the real world,
hospitals are in the business of saving lives, and managed care organizations are in the
business of saving dollars.” FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302
(W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997).
Managed care organizations were consumed by a political firestorm in the 1990s when
they were accused of “rationing” arguably beneficial care. See Michael E. Chernew et
al., Barriers to Constraining Health Care Cost Growth, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at
122, 127-28 (noting that “the backlash against managed care” could “limit the effectiveness of . . . managed competition”); Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A
Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 427, 427 (2005) (discussing state regulations enacted in the late 1990s and the managed care industry’s “retreat” from the
use of “key cost-containment techniques”).
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These observations force the conclusion that “U.S.-style private
health insurance, by greatly weakening price elasticity of demand as a
constraint on monopoly pricing by health care providers and suppliers, facilitates the latter’s exercise of market power, producing profits
65
substantially exceeding the usual returns to lawful monopoly.” This
has significant implications for antitrust policy. Though it belabors
the obvious, it is worth emphasizing that inflated prices are a founda66
tional target for antitrust policy, and policing the health care industry is of heightened importance if monopoly power in that sector leads
to prices that are even more inflated than monopolies in other industries. However objectionable market concentration might normally
be, health sector concentration combined with health insurance is
cause for particular alarm.
Thus, the emphasis on the significance of corporate form—which
has preoccupied the courts—is highly misplaced. Even assuming that
nonprofit hospitals with market power set prices statistically lower
than for-profit hospitals with equal market power, it would be premature—and grossly inaccurate—to conclude that merger review should
be permissive. To the contrary, the presence of health insurance
means that hospital market power—whether held by nonprofits or forprofits—is a cause for great alarm and deserves heightened antitrust
scrutiny. Rather than focusing on corporate form, empirical scrutiny
should focus on the economic consequences of combining market
power with health insurance. The crucial test to determine whether
nonprofit-hospital market concentration is benign is to compare nonprofit-hospital pricing in the presence of market power to nonprofithospital pricing in the absence of market power. Since health insurance affects consumers’ price sensitivities, such a study would likely
reveal a significant difference. A second empirical test would examine
the effect of insurance on prices. For example, it would study
whether, under conditions of market concentration, medical services
that typically are not insured—such as elective cosmetic surgery—

65

Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American
Health Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 7, 30.
66
See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 784-85 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a restraint’s likely effect on prices will determine whether it is anticompetitive); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 50 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the suggestion that “the primary intent of the Sherman Act’s framer” may have
been “the distributive goal of preventing monopolists from transferring wealth away
from consumers” in the form of higher prices).
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67

exhibit smaller mark-ups than insured services. These tests could determine the actual effect of insurance on health care prices, and thus
might usefully inform antitrust policymakers as to when they should
be concerned, and when they should be very concerned, about pockets of market power.
Given the potent combination of health insurance and market
concentration in the health sector, it is a matter of significant concern
that many services in the health care industry are highly concen68
trated. But the FTC’s concern with growing industry concentration
in the health care sector, and its desperate call for greater competi69
tion, does not specify why hospital consolidations should evoke such
alarm. It is the specific combination of U.S.-style health insurance with
health care provider market power that demands remedial attention,
with health insurance both reshaping and reemphasizing the problem
of market power. Whether the monopolist is nonprofit can be only
marginally relevant. Of far greater antitrust concern is whether the
monopolist serves a market covered by insurance.
B. The Effects on Output: The Antitrust of Overconsumption
In addition to the pervasiveness of insurance, a second prominent
feature of the U.S. health care landscape is the tax exclusion of insurance premiums. Compensation paid to workers in the form of employer-paid health insurance premiums is excluded from both indi70
viduals’ taxable income and employers’ payroll taxes. Consequently,
it is mutually beneficial for both employers and employees to create
compensation packages that substitute income for generous health
insurance, causing individuals to purchase health coverage that is
more generous than they otherwise would purchase without the tax
71
subsidy.
67

A correlation between mark-ups and insurance, however, might be confounded
by variations on demand elasticity. Services for which there is elastic demand would,
by definition, exhibit smaller mark-ups for a given degree of market concentration,
and it is possible that these services are also less likely to receive insurance coverage.
68
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
69
See A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 1.
70
For an overview and critique of the health-related tax exclusions, and a proposal
for reform, see PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR,
AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 78-82 (2005), available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/.
71
Id. at 80. The panel emphasized that “tax preferences for health care represent
the largest tax expenditure and have an outsized impact on health care spending in
America.” Id. at 79.
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Even unsubsidized health insurance, by presenting insureds with
copayments that are a fraction of market prices, induces individuals to
72
consume more than they otherwise would without insurance.
By
subsidizing the purchase of health insurance, the tax exclusion leads
to insurance benefits that even further reduce copayments and expand coverage of health services. Thus, despite widespread provider
market power—enjoyed by nonprofits and for-profits alike—and the
73
pervasiveness of supracompetitive prices, U.S.-style insurance subsidizes demand and maintains the moral hazard problem of overconsumption. Thus, America’s health system faces the sad irony that monopoly prices, and even “supramonopoly” prices, do not prompt
reductions in consumption of medical services. To the contrary, the
tax subsidy and U.S.-style insurance overcome any depressive effect on
demand that monopoly prices would normally have.
Perhaps the stimulating effect of subsidized insurance on consumption should be applauded. If the traditional antitrust concern
74
over rising prices is that they lead to a reduction in output, then
health insurance’s stimulation of demand despite the presence of monopolies might be reason to restrain, rather than reinvigorate, antitrust scrutiny in this area. The health care industry, however, is an instance in which maximizing output does not translate into maximizing
total surplus. This has been labeled the “too much of a good thing”
75
problem. Even though rising prices might not reduce total output—
and, in fact, total output might even achieve theoretically optimal levels if insurance copayments are set at the marginal costs to deliver
care—there are instead severe allocative inefficiencies, which are cer76
tainly a matter of antitrust concern.
Since insurance-facilitated

72

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 13.
74
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107-08 (1984) (“Restrictions on
price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the
Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (“[O]ur inquiry must focus on . . . whether the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output . . . .”).
75
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 65, at 24.
76
See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107 (commenting that being “unresponsive to consumer preference . . . is perhaps the most significant [anticompetitive consequence],
since Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription” (internal quotation marks omitted)); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 (1978) (“The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the
effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.”).
73
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moral hazard induces individuals to consume services they otherwise
77
would forgo, the ultimate price consumers pay for such services (including the appropriate portion of their insurance premiums) exceeds what consumers would otherwise choose for themselves in the
78
presence of a well-working market and in the absence of insurance.
With such distortions on price, and their mute effect on consumption
behavior, the costs of many services likely far exceed the surplus they
generate.
Moreover, subsidized insurance and the resulting overconsumption create severe dynamic inefficiencies. Health care providers expand costly services with the confidence that most of the visible costs
will be covered by insurance, and they have little incentive to meet
consumer benefit-cost priorities because the subsidized moral hazard
problem prevents consumers from being appropriately cost conscious.
In addition, providers make ambitious investments to deliver newer
and costlier services that are unlikely to enhance overall welfare but
79
are nonetheless profitable to providers. Health policy experts agree
that investments in new health care technologies, whose profitability
has been virtually guaranteed by comprehensive health insurance, are
80
the primary culprit for escalating health care costs.
Consequently, moral hazard and subsequent overconsumption do
not correct for the antitrust problems created by inflated prices;
rather, because they induce inefficient expenditures despite those
prices, and because they institute inefficient incentives to overinvest in
future health care consumption, they are additional reasons for alarm.
These harms of overconsumption have important implications for antitrust law since they suggest that antitrust policies should take steps to
stem the proliferation of output. But courts, to the contrary, are seduced by such pledges to expand output, and overconsumption is
ironically applauded. In fact, the harms of overconsumption often re-

77

See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 65, at 31 (describing “the tendency of insurance to induce consumption that would not otherwise occur”).
78
This is particularly true when one considers the dynamic consequences of moral
hazard, whereby subsidized demand stimulates investments in expensive new technologies in which many consumers would prefer not to invest. See id. at 25-27; see also
Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy to Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Distribution of
Well-Being, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 83, 100.
79
See Pauly, supra note 78, at 100 (arguing that “the health-insurance tax subsidy
harms low-income people in a dynamic context by fueling the already-present eagerness on the part of higher-income people to have access to the latest, expensive technology”).
80
See AARON, supra note 12, at 48-49.
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inforce supracompetitive pricing, since nonprofits have successfully
justified their supracompetitive prices by claiming a need to finance
additional activities, such as charity care and research. The Butterworth
court, for example, relaxed its antitrust scrutiny in part because the
merging entities pledged to invest in new facilities and “to provide
quality healthcare programs for the underserved without regard to
81
ability to pay.” One year later, a New York court—relying heavily on
the Carilion-Freeman-Butterworth trilogy—approved a merger between
nonprofit hospitals in part because the merged entity promised to expend an additional $50 million “to provide high quality health care to
economically disadvantaged and elderly members of the commu82
nity.” However admirable such activities might be, they do not warrant amnesty from the antitrust laws. Unfortunately, such assurances
have become a common tactic to solicit community support and judicial sympathy, even though they reduce the efficiency of health care
investments and further damage the market for health care services.
By lending credence to, and perhaps even encouraging, pledges by
merging entities to invest in new health care delivery, these courts and
others have enabled a substantial departure from antitrust princi83
ples.
If allocative efficiency is of any antitrust concern, courts scrutinizing proposed mergers of nonprofits should consider such investments
in additional output as a reason to oppose, not support, the mergers.
Increases in output of this sort survive only because of insurance subsidies and other rents, not because they enhance the efficiency of the
market and direct resources to best meet society’s needs.
C. The Effects of Cost-Shifting: The Antitrust of Cross-Subsidies
In addition to inflating prices and facilitating overconsumption,
nonprofit hospitals’ accrual of market power imposes additional inefficiencies that are closely connected to their nonprofit status. These
harms are motivated by the nondistribution constraint, the founda81

FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1300, 1306 (W.D. Mich.
1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997).
82
United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y.
1997).
83
An admirable exception, in which a court did recognize that promising additional output and investments do not excuse an antitrust violation, is United States v.
Rockford Memorial Corp. See 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that the
stated intention of the merging hospitals “to create a state-of-the-art tertiary referral
center” is irrelevant to the antitrust inquiry), aff’d, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
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tional rule in the U.S. tax code that prohibits the nonprofit organiza84
tion from distributing net earnings to any individual or shareholder.
The tax code does not, however, prohibit nonprofits from exacting
positive margins on certain services, and (as discussed above) nonprofits display a strong inclination to charge whatever prices the mar85
ket will bear. To accommodate the nondistribution constraint, nonprofits have been shown to adjust discretionary spending in other
health care activities (rather than reducing prices) such that their net
86
earnings approximate zero.
Thus, any surplus gained by nonprofit hospitals must remain
within the health care system, causing those institutions to plow their
87
excess earnings back into the health care enterprise.
These rents
proceed to fund the many activities that the hospital’s leaders deem
worthy, such as uncompensated and undercharged care for indigent
and low-income patients (including adjustments for underpayments
by Medicare and Medicaid) as well as less munificent services, such as
discounted medical instruction, research, and loss-leaders in growing
markets that might translate into future market power and lucrative
88
services.
In short, nonprofit hospitals create their own intricate

84

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (limiting nonprofit status to entities “no part of the
net earnings of which inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”).
85
See supra notes 48 & 54-55 and accompanying text.
86
See, e.g., Andrew J. Leone & R. Lawrence Van Horn, How Do Nonprofit Hospitals
Manage Earnings?, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 815, 835 (2005). The nondistribution constraint and resulting cross-subsidies also suggest that even if one accepts the FTC’s
conclusion that “nonprofits exploit market power when given the opportunity to do
so,” A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 33, a nonprofit’s supracompetitive prices for some services will by necessity translate into reductions in prices for others. In other words, nonprofit hospitals and for-profits do, in fact, price slightly differently from each other, even if those pricing differences do not mitigate the harms
imposed by nonprofit power.
87
There is also substantial evidence for the converse, that as competition increases
and nonprofit hospitals are forced to charge competitive prices, nonprofits reduce
their expenditures on uncompensated care. See Jonathan Gruber, The Effect of Competitive Pressure on Charity: Hospital Responses to Price Shopping in California, 38 J. HEALTH
ECON. 183, 208 (1994). However, at least one study has concluded that charity care
does not increase even as competition is reduced, thus offering “no support to the
claim made by some that hospital mergers lead to benefits for uninsured patients
through cross-subsidization from insured patients.” Christopher Garmon, Hospital
Competition and Charity Care 6 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 285, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp285.pdf.
88
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 65, at 22-23.
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world of cross-subsidies, in which the excess earnings from some ser89
vices finance activities that the market would not otherwise support.
Though a nonprofit’s inflation of some prices while reducing others can itself be objectionable under antitrust principles if it facilitates
90
inefficient consumption, pervasive cross-subsidies invite an additional antitrust concern. Unlike for-profit monopolies, which can
channel their rents into efficient, market-driven uses, nonprofits are
restrained to expend their monopoly rents within the health care system regardless of how efficient or inefficient such investments might
be. This system of cross-subsidies has always been a cornerstone of the
operation of nonprofit hospitals. Several studies indicate that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for-profits to pursue new expen91
sive technologies with uncertain returns.
Moreover, a former
prominent health care policymaker, conceding that “[h]ospitals in
the United States have engaged in internal cross-subsidization
throughout their history,” warned that subjecting hospitals to increased competition would endanger their ability to provide the
community services that governments have traditionally avoided pay92
ing for themselves. A sympathetic observer might characterize these
cross-subsidies as the channeling of excess revenues into admirable,
socially beneficial health care activities. A proper antitrust perspective, however, recognizes that these fund transfers support activities
that are not demanded by the market, are unsustainable absent gen-

89

It is entirely possible that the surplus from supracompetitive prices is whittled
away by inflated salaries, administrative inefficiencies, or undesired quality improvements. See id. (“[I]n the absence of either market discipline or effective political oversight, there is no assurance that easily gained revenues will not be squandered in lowpriority activities, in overpaying for inputs, or simply through managerial slack.”). But
this kind of waste can itself be characterized as a subsidy. See id. at 18-19. Also, there is
some (contested) evidence suggesting that nonprofit hospitals have lower costs and
larger efficiencies than for-profits. See Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau, Performance
Evaluations of For-Profit and Nonprofit U.S. Hospitals Since 1980, 13 NONPROFIT MGMT. &
LEADERSHIP 401, 407 (2003).
90
See supra Part II.B.
91
See Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 175
(2007) (finding that nonprofit hospitals provide services that are unlikely to be offered
by for-profits); Mark Schlesinger & Bradford H. Gray, Why Nonprofits Matter in American
Medicine: A Policy Brief 10-11 (The Aspen Inst., Nonprofit Sector Research Fund Working Paper Series, 2005), available at http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/nsr_doc/
Healthcare.pdf (praising nonprofit hospitals for serving “as the incubator for entirely
new services . . . for which payment systems have not been regularized” and for being
“slower [than for-profits] to react to changing conditions”).
92
Bruce C. Vladeck, Paying for Hospitals’ Community Service, 25 HEALTH AFF. 34, 34
(2006).
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erous subsidies, and are therefore not efficient market-driven uses for
valuable resources. If any of these activities are deemed socially desirable public goods and worthy of public support—and many undoubtedly are—then they should be supported by public institutions following a transparent and accountable public debate, not through carvedout exceptions to the antitrust laws that entrust paternalistic power to
93
a few private actors.
Cross-subsidies have not escaped the notice of courts, which have
correctly understood that nonprofit hospitals gather surplus through
supracompetitive pricing and spend it on excess health care. However, these practices have served as reasons to approve a merger, not
reasons to reject one. In some recent merger cases, courts have even
made explicit allowances for, and imposed implicit requirements on,
nonprofit hospitals to engage in cross-subsidies. For example, in
permitting two nonprofit hospitals to merge in 1997, the Eastern District of New York explained that
both hospitals provide millions of dollars worth of free medical care to
individuals in need. Any profit is funneled back into the community in
the form of new programs and facilities. . . . All of these beneficial factors support the defendants’ contention that community service[,] not
94
profit maximization, is the hospitals’ mission.

Thus, the hospitals’ cross-subsidies helped defend a merger,
rather than serving as a troubling indication that the hospitals enjoyed
market power. But this allowance is a departure from the central
economic goals of antitrust law. Antitrust law has not recognized as a
legitimate defense a claim by an otherwise illegal monopolist or cartel
95
that its economic rents are spent toward socially useful applications,
93

Another reason for objecting to financing hospital activities through crosssubsidies is their regressive impact on working-class individuals. Privately financed
health care is predominantly supported through health insurance premiums, which
fall equally upon all insured individuals, regardless of income, akin to a head tax. Public financing for socially desirable health care spending would be supported though a
far more progressive system of taxation. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 65, at
28-29.
94
United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 146 (E.D.N.Y.
1997).
95
But see United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (allowing
“the undisputed public interest in equality of educational access and opportunity” to
be considered as justification for a group of colleges’ collusion on financial aid). For
criticisms of Brown University, see Lee Goldman, The Politically Correct Corporation and the
Antitrust Laws: The Proper Treatment of Noneconomic or Social Welfare Justifications Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 148 (1995) (“Even assuming
that the defendants genuinely intend to benefit the public, they still cannot be trusted
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and arguments by nonprofit hospitals to justify their monopoly rents
should be met with similar skepticism. If courts were to evaluate proposed mergers with a focus on allocative efficiency, antitrust law could
play a constructive role in ending the misallocation of significant social resources and encouraging a transparent debate over how to finance public needs.
Of course, disassembling the health care industry’s system of crosssubsidies would be a daunting task. The system is deeply rooted in accounting and delivery systems, and the powerful industry is highly incentivized to do what it can to maintain control over its captured
rents. But more importantly, the system of cross-subsidies enjoys the
thorough protection of several legal authorities and has become part
of the very fabric that defines nonprofit status. Even the earliest IRS
revenue rulings determining whether hospitals were exempt from paying taxes hinged upon the maintenance of a healthy system of crosssubsidies. For example, in commenting on the seminal Revenue Rul96
ing 56-185, which provided a list of “requirements” for the exemption of a nonprofit hospital, one noted expert on tax-exempt organizations observed:

to balance properly the asserted public interest benefits against the resulting harms to
competition so long as they receive direct financial advantages.”).
96
Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (interpreting § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code and listing requirements for hospitals to qualify for tax-exempt status).
Battles over the interpretation of § 501(c)(3) and the granting of tax-exempt status to
hospitals have been the source of heated and sustained litigation. Part of the problem
is that the section and its associated revenue rulings impose vague and unspecific standards, but the granting of tax-exempt status also involves big dollars and emotional
politics. For example, when the 1956 ruling required nonprofits to provide uncompensated care “to the extent of its financial ability,” the industry protested and earned
in 1969 the less demanding requirement to provide a “benefit to the community.”
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; see also David M. Studdert et al., Regulatory and Judicial Oversight of Nonprofit Hospitals, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 625, 626 (2007). Relatedly,
“[m]ore than 100 lawsuits have been filed accusing [nonprofit hospitals] of shirking
their charitable commitments by charging uninsured patients high fees and then pursuing these ‘debts.’” Id. at 625. The topic’s political salience has made it a favorite
subject for politicians, and both Congress and the executive branch are considering
alternatives to the community benefit standard in order to extract more uncompensated care from nonprofits. See, e.g., Sen. Grassley Questions Tax Status of Nonprofit Hospitals, May Seek Legislation, 15 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1048, 1048 (Sept. 14, 2006) (recounting a senator’s “stinging rebuke to the nation’s nonprofit hospitals” for “in some
cases do[ing] less than for-profit institutions in providing charity care”); IRS Interim
Report Should Address Community Benefit, Treasury IG Says, 16 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 491,
492 (Apr. 19, 2007) (quoting one observer as saying that “exempt hospitals remain the
focus of congressional, IRS, and other federal governmental concern and scrutiny”).
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[T]he ruling explained that such a hospital “must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered . . . .” The clear implication of the paragraph was that an exempt
hospital was expected to engage in more or less explicit crosssubsidization among patient groups, with those who could afford treatment paying for the total costs of operating the hospital, including costs
attributable to care for those who could not afford to pay the full costs, if
97
they could indeed afford to pay anything at all.

Cross-subsidies continue to remain at the heart of nonprofit status
in the health care sector—but again as something the law requires,
not as something deemed undesirable. For example, when a group of
health maintenance organizations sought nonprofit status, they encountered hostility when they suggested that they deserved the tax ex98
emption because they could provide care at more competitive costs.
Instead, the IRS and a recent Tenth Circuit ruling demanded “some
99
additional ‘plus.’” One commentator explained that “[t]he amorphous ‘plus’ factor can vary, but the Tenth Circuit suggested that devoting surpluses to research or teaching, or providing free or below100
cost services, would normally qualify.”
The great irony in these tax cases and revenue rulings is that an
entity must exercise market power in order to implement the crosssubsidies necessary to obtain tax exempt status; therefore, all entities
that qualify for nonprofit status must necessarily exercise some market
power. But this irony, and the implicit alarm it sounds to antitrust
law, has largely been lost on the courts. Whether applying antitrust
law or tax law, courts have largely deemed market power of this sort to
be admirable, and a reason to protect nonprofit hospitals from standard antitrust scrutiny. A proper application of antitrust law would
instead understand that extensive cross-subsidies are reasons to subject nonprofits to additional scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
This Article issues a plea to courts to apply the most basic antitrust
principles when reviewing challenges to proposed mergers of nonprofit hospitals. Unpacking the complex web of health care financing
reveals many inefficiencies that are exacerbated by nonprofit market
97

Schmalbeck, supra note 22, at 124 (citation omitted).
IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r., 325 F.3d 1188, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003).
99
Id. at 1197 (citing Rev. Rul. 69-545). The court also required that a nonprofit
“make its services available to all in the community.” Id. at 1198.
100
Schmalbeck, supra note 22, at 128 (citing IHC Health Plans, 325 F.3d at 1197).
98
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power, and a renewed emphasis on foundational antitrust principles—competitive prices, optimal output, and allocative efficiency—
would both challenge many predispositions toward nonprofit health
care providers and lead to a far less permissive merger policy.
Conveniently, this Article’s lessons translate into easily applied legal rules. It argues that merger law has been both muddied and weakened when courts give inappropriate weight to factors such as a hospital’s nonprofit status, pledges to expand output, and promises for
generous below-cost services financed by cross-subsidies. A proper
application of antitrust law would prevent courts from considering
these factors and require them to proceed instead with a standard antitrust analysis. This return to antitrust basics, in addition to simplifying the court’s duties, complements the many other compelling reasons for judges and juries to pay greater heed to the FTC’s merger
challenges.
It is possible that the FTC’s persistence might soon pay off and its
record on hospital mergers could turn around. Another chapter is
now being written by In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., in
which the FTC is challenging a merger of an academic hospital and a
community hospital that since 2000 have been operated by a non101
profit corporation, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare (ENH).
On
August 7, 2007, the FTC Commissioners unanimously ruled that the
merged entity created a highly concentrated market, increased hospital prices, harmed consumers, and thereby violated section 7 of the
102
Clayton Act.
Of great significance was the ruling’s rejection of the
defendant’s proffered justifications for leniency from antitrust scrutiny. In a repudiation of the Carilion-Freeman-Butterworth trilogy, the
Commission tersely concluded that “ENH’s non-profit status did not
affect its efforts to raise prices after the merger, and . . . does not suffice to rebut complaint counsel’s evidence of anticompetitive ef103
fects.”
Perhaps more significantly, the Commission dismissed
ENH’s assertion that its merger was procompetitive because it spent
101

See In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, at 5-7 (FTC Oct. 20, 2005)
(initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
adjpro/d9315/051020initialdecision.pdf.
102
In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, at 78 (FTC Aug. 6, 2007)
(opinion of the Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/
070806opinion.pdf. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition of assets “in
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, [where] the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
103
In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp. (opinion of the Commission) at 85.
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over $120 million post-merger to make improvements and expand
health care services, noting instead that quality improvements must
104
result from cost-saving efficiencies to squarely warrant a justification.
It was an admirable recognition that enhanced output and the temptation of cross subsidies do not outweigh the harm from (and are in
fact products of) provider market power.
The FTC’s decision to challenge the ENH merger retroactively has
been described as “a renewed commitment to hospital merger en105
forcement.” Moreover,
given how much the FTC has invested in this case in terms of time, resources and reputation, [and] the importance of this case to the future
of the FTC’s health care antitrust enforcement mission, the FTC cannot
afford to reverse course. . . . The high stakes involved virtually guarantee
that this case will continue to be hard-fought and is likely to become a
bellwether of future government antitrust enforcement in hospital
106
mergers.

But the FTC does not enjoy the final say, and if ENH decides to appeal the Commission’s ruling, the case will fall into the hands of the
judiciary. How the courts will handle the case, and how they will address the defendant’s justifications, might significantly shape merger
law. Hopefully, the courts will seize upon the opportunity to bring an
end to the mistaken Carilion-Freeman-Butterworth trilogy, recognize
the dangers of nonprofit market power, and restore foundational antitrust analysis in the market for hospital services.

104

Id. at 81-82.
Barak D. Richman, The Corrosive Combination of Nonprofit Monopolies and U.S.-Style
Health Insurance: Implications for Antitrust and Merger Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 2006, at 139, 146 (quoting Michael R. Bissegger, FTC ALJ Finds that Evanston
Hospital Merger Violated Antitrust Law and Orders Divestiture (Oct. 28, 2005),
http://www.ebglaw.com/article_1198.html).
106
Id. at 146-47 (quoting Bissegger, supra note 105).
105

